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Wednesday, 16 August 2017
quote [ When you sit down with Phil Frana, you better buckle up for a conversation that ranges from the history of artificial intelligence (he's literally writing the book on it) to visions of the future, including uploading our minds to the singularity and 3-D printing our way to a utopian society. Phil is one of the speakers at the upcoming Escape Velocity 2017, the Museum of Science Fiction's annual sci-fi and science event, where he'll be leading a talk on matter duplicators. Ahead of Escape Velocity, we sat down with Phil to talk about sci-fi, tech, and the future. ]
Digitally uploading consciousness seems like a variant of the teleporter problem. Which one is you? And if you're so unattached to the idea of your singular self why would you care about living forever if that's not going to be you anyway?
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robotroadkill said @ 2:52am GMT on 17th August
I've thought about this too, didn't realize it was a thing.
If someone duplicated me exactly, including my memories and tendencies, I wouldn't suddenly be OK with beng killed, knowing that elsewhere my mind and experiences would go on. Likewise with having my living form obliterated in the ship and then reconstituted with other molecules down on the planet. The new version coming out the other end wouldn't know the difference, but the one going in is gone forever.
robotroadkill said @ 2:52am GMT on 17th August
I've thought about this too, didn't realize it was a thing.
If someone duplicated me exactly, including my memories and tendencies, I wouldn't suddenly be OK with being killed, knowing that elsewhere my mind and experiences would go on. Likewise with having my living form obliterated in the ship and then reconstituted with other molecules down on the planet. The new version coming out the other end wouldn't know the difference, but the one going in is gone forever.
<-- Entry / Current Comment
robotroadkill said @ 2:52am GMT on 17th August
I've thought about this too, didn't realize it was a thing.
If someone duplicated me exactly, including my memories and tendencies, I wouldn't suddenly be OK with being killed, knowing that elsewhere my mind and experiences would go on. Likewise with having my living form obliterated in the ship and then reconstituted with other molecules down on the planet. The new version coming out the other end wouldn't know the difference, but the one going in is gone forever.
